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Abstract.- We set up a dynamic model of ﬁrm investment in which liquidity con-
straints enter explicitly into the ﬁrm’s maximization problem. The optimal policy
rules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the structural
parameters of the model. Investment is positively related to the ﬁrm’s internal ﬁnan-
cial position when the ﬁrm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy
ﬁrms, which can reach their desired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing
function of ﬁnancial position for poor ﬁrms. This relationship is reversed as a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial position improves, and large ﬁrms hold little debt. We ﬁnd that liquidity con-
straints matter signiﬁcantly for the investment decisions of ﬁrms. If ﬁrms can ﬁnance
investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average
capital stock is about 6% higher over a period of 20 years. Transitory interest rate
shocks have a sustained impact on capital accumulation, which lasts for several peri-
ods.
Keywords: Investment, liquidity constraints, estimation of dynamic structural mod-
els, ﬁnancial accelerator.
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1 Introduction
A large theoretical and empirical literature has highlighted the importance of credit
market frictions in understanding real activity.1 This literature rejects the Miller-
Modigliani (1958) proposition of the irrelevance of the ﬁnancial structure for real
decisions, and argues that the violation of the assumptions of full information and
perfect markets which underlie this proposition could create a role for a ﬁrm’s net
worth and its access to funds in determining investment. Asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders implies that the cost of external funds for the ﬁrm
may be higher than the opportunity cost of internal funds, and related to its ability
to provide collateral. This aspect of ﬁrm behavior has important consequences for the
propagation of business cycles. An economic downturn that adversely aﬀects balance
sheets, and through it, a ﬁrm’s collaterizable net worth, increases the agency costs
of borrowing and reduces the access of ﬁrms to credit. This constrains investment
and magniﬁes the eﬀect of real and nominal shocks to the economy (Gertler 1988,
Bernanke & Gertler 1989, Bernanke & Gertler 1990, Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist
1999). The magnitude of these liquidity constraints and their relationship to invest-
ment is therefore a matter of some interest.
The sensitivity of investment to ﬁnancial variables at the ﬁrm level has been well
documented with reduced form approaches. Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988), this literature ﬁnds that in simple panel regressions, investment and cash ﬂow
are positively related even after investment opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s
q, are controlled for. This relationship is stronger for small ﬁrms, ﬁrms with a low
dividend payout or with low bond ratings. In other words, ﬁrms which would ap r i o r i
be expected to have less access to credit markets seem to display greater sensitivity
of investment to internal funds.2
1For a detailed bibliography, see Bernanke, Gertler & Gilchrist (1999).
2This result is robust across several sample splits and for several countries. Hoshi, Kashyap &
Scharfstein (1991) ﬁnd that membership of an industrial keiretsu in Japan reduces the sensitivity
of investment to cash ﬂow. Similar results are obtained when the sample is divided on the basis of
bond ratings (Gilchrist & Himmelberg 1995) and size (Gertler & Gilchrist 1994). Firm level dataFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 2
While such studies establish the existence of a relationship between real and ﬁ-
nancial variables at the ﬁrm level, a common criticism of their methodology is the
following: in the event that q is mismeasured, the cash ﬂow variable picks up invest-
ment opportunities for ﬁrms which are not captured by q. The correlation between
cash ﬂow and investment could potentially arise due to this and not due to liquidity
constraints. The underlying relationship between these variables is never clearly spelt
out, making the coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow hard to interpret.
An alternative approach, which side steps the problems associated with the mea-
surement of q has been to test for the Euler condition for investment implied by a
model of perfect capital markets. Most studies ﬁnd that the restriction is strongly
rejected for ﬁrms which have been identiﬁed as constrained.3
Although this method can circumvent the problems associated with the mea-
surement of q,i ts u ﬀers from some of the same drawbacks. The rejection of a null
hypothesis of a speciﬁc investment model without liquidity constraints does not give
us any information on what an alternative model should be. Moreover, as has been
pointed out in the consumption literature (see, for example, Attanasio 1995), this
method may not be able to detect liquidity constraints if their magnitude does not
vary from period to period.
Our paper is an attempt to understand this relationship at a theoretical as well as
an empirical level. We depart from the standard neo classical hypothesis of perfect
capital markets and explicitly incorporate liquidity constraints into a dynamic model
for the U.K. (Devereaux and Schiantarelli 1989), Italy (Schiantarelli & Sembellini 2000) and Canada
(Schaller 1993) have all conﬁrmed that constrained ﬁrms display a higher sensitivity of investment
to cash ﬂow. For a detailed review of this literature, see Hubbard (1998). An exception is Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) who ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow does not increase monotonically
across groups of ﬁr m sa st h ed e g r e eo fﬁnancial constraint increases. In fact, ﬁrms which seem less
constrained according to several criteria have a higher coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow, as compared to more
constrained ﬁrms. Pratap (forthcoming) shows that this result is consistent with the presence of
liquidity constraints when capital adjustment costs are non-convex.
3See for example, Whited (1992) and Kwon (1994) for this result in US ﬁrm data in the man-
ufacturing and retail sector respectively. Similar results have been obtained for ﬁrm level data in
the U.K. (Bond & Meghir 1994) and Canada (Ng & Schaller 1996) and aggregate data in the U.S.
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of ﬁrm investment. This allows us to identify the eﬀects of ﬁnancial variables on
ﬁrm investment. We integrate the solution to the ﬁrm’s maximization problem into
a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the structural parameters of the model.
This enables us to separate the eﬀects of real and ﬁnancial variables on investment
and to quantify the importance of liquidity constraints. To the best of our knowledge
this is the ﬁrst paper to be able to do so while circumventing the problems associated
with the measurement of these variables.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the empirical level, estimating the
structural parameters of the model and simulating time paths for investment gives us
an idea of the magnitude of liquidity constraints. We are also able to trace the eﬀects
of transitory changes to cash ﬂow. Our set up, therefore, allows us to study the eﬀect
of policy changes which aﬀect these variables on the investment proﬁle of ﬁrms. More
generally, at a methodological level, we establish a procedure to separate the eﬀects
of ﬁrm fundamentals from those of ﬁnancial variables on investment, which can then
be applied to a broad class of models.
We ﬁnd that the data reject a model speciﬁcation of no liquidity constraints in fa-
vor of a model with some liquidity constraints. These constraints exercise a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on ﬁrm investment. Their magnitude is quantiﬁed by using the parameters we
estimate and simulating ﬁrm investment paths over 20 years. This path is then com-
pared to the counterfactual investment path which would have obtained, had liquidity
constraints not been imposed in the maximization problem of the ﬁrm. A comparison
of the two paths shows that ﬁrms which face some degree of liquidity constraints are
able to accumulate 6% less capital on average over this period as compared to ﬁrms
which do not face this constraint. Moreover, a transitory increase in interest rate
has a persistent eﬀect on ﬁrm investment for the liquidity constrained group of ﬁrms.
However, unconstrained ﬁrms are not aﬀected at all by this transitory increase.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the model. While
a closed form solution does not exist, we characterize the optimal policy rules forFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 4
capital and debt, and present some numerical simulations to illustrate the intuition
behind the model. Section 3 discusses the data used in the estimation. In Section 4,
we discuss the sources of identiﬁcation, the estimation procedure and the construction
of the likelihood function. We also discuss the results we obtain. Section 5 compares
the model predicted distributions of capital stock and debt with the actual data and
shows the results of goodness of ﬁt tests. In section 6, we present the results of policy
experiments using the parameters we estimated. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The model we use is a simple neo classical model of investment, augmented by liq-
uidity constraints and an exit rule for ﬁrms. Firms maximize the expected sum of a
discounted stream of dividends by choosing investment and debt each period. Liq-
uidity constraints enter the problem in the following ways: (i) the ﬁrm is restricted in
the amount of equity it can issue,4 (ii) if the value of the ﬁrm falls below its outside
option, it defaults on its debt and leaves the industry, (iii) debt is available at a rate
which takes this possibility of default into account and is higher than the risk free
rate.5
We depart from the conventional neoclassical investment model in that we do not
include convex adjustment costs of capital. Recent literature has highlighted the role
of irreversibilities and non convexities in adjustment costs and indicated that there
may be no empirical basis for the commonly used quadratic functional form.6 It is
4We motivate this assumption by the fact that equity ﬁnance is expensive for ﬁrms as external
investors do not know about ﬁrm quality and demand a premium on their return (Greenwald,
Stiglitz & Weiss 1984, Myers & Majluf 1984). Gomes (2001) posits an exogenous parameterized cost
of external funds, in a model where new equity is the only source of external ﬁnance. Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) also use an exogeneous parameter for equity costs. For a model which endogenizes
ﬁrms’ initial public oﬀering see Clementi (2000).
5Gross (1994) has a model with a similar exit rule but a diﬀerent debt contract and equity
restriction.
6See for example Doms & Dunne (1998), Ito (1996), Barnett & Sakelleris (1998) and Abel &
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beyond the scope of this paper to establish an appropriate speciﬁcation of adjustment
costs and therefore we do not address this issue.7
It is worth mentioning here that, like Cooley & Quadrini (2001) we use simple one
p e r i o dd e b tc o n t r a c t s . T h ee q u i t yc o n s t r a i n ta n dt h ee x i tr u l ea r ei m p o s e de x o g e -
nously to make the estimation of the model possible, and the borrowing constraint
arises endogenously as a result of the latter. There is a large literature which stud-
ies endogenous borrowing constraints as a consequence of asymmetric information or
enforceability restrictions. See for example, Kocherlakota (1996), Alburquerque and
Hopenhayn (1997), Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2000). While such an approach is certainly more theoretically complete, the map-
ping from these models to the data is by no means clear and this is a constraint
for estimating them. Furthermore, embedding an optimal contract in our framework
signiﬁcantly increases the computational burden. Nevertheless, as the next section
shows us, this relatively simple model is also able to account for several of the stylized
facts that other models can. We therefore leave the question of estimating models
with enforceability and information restrictions for future research.
2.1 The ﬁrm’s problem











7In other work (Pratap forthcoming, Rendón 1999) we consider the interaction between liquidity
constraints and non convex adjustment costs.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 6
where ρ is the discount rate (assumed to be equal to the risk free rate). D represents
the ﬁrm’s dividends8 at time t,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned as
D = θK
α − (1 + r)B − I + B
0.
B is the ﬁrm’s debt that must be paid at time t, at the interest rate r , I is the ﬁrm’s
investment at time t,a n dB0 is the debt contracted at period t, that will be due in
the next period t +1 . Capital accumulation satisﬁes the law of motion
K
0 =( 1− δ)K + I.
where K and K0 are the capital stock at time t and t+1respectively, and δ denotes
the depreciation rate which is assumed to be the same for all ﬁrms and constant over
time.
The ﬁrm operates in a risky environment captured by an idiosyncratic productivity
θ, which follows a Markov process P (θ
0|θ), parameterized as an AR(1) process,
θ
0 = γθ+ε, ε ∼ N (µ,σ2). This variable can be a technology or demand shock and is
observed by the ﬁrm and the lenders before investment and borrowing decisions are
made.
In what follows, we shall ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial resources
x as the sum of proﬁts and undepreciated capital, net of debt repayments, i.e.
x = θK
α +( 1− δ)K − (1 + r)B.
Liquidity constraints enter the ﬁrms problem in the following way. The restriction on
issuing equity implies
D ≥ D. (1)
8Since we are going to estimate the model, it is convenient to introduce functional forms right
away.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 7
A particular case of this constraint is that dividends are non negative, i.e., D ≥ 0.
Let the interest rate charged on debt B0 be r0. Assuming that lenders have access
to an elastic supply of funds at the risk free rate, competition among lenders leads to




0 − (1 + ρ)B
0 =0
where π is the probability of exit which will be derived subsequently. The ﬁrst term
represents the expected return of the lender while the second term is the opportunity
cost of the funds. The interest rate emerging from this condition is r0(K0,B0,θ) and
is explained below in greater detail.
We also rule out that the ﬁrm lends money in any way, by assuming that borrowing
is strictly non negative, that is
B
0 ≥ 0. (2)
T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si sa sf o l l o w s :aﬁrm enters each period with a stock of
capital K and a stock of debt B; the latter is contracted at an interest rate r. The
stochastic shock θ is realized which determines the value of x. If x<0,t h eﬁrm
defaults on its debt and exits. A non negative x implies that the ﬁrm pays its debts
and continues. We abstract from enforceability problems and assume that ﬁrms will
always pay their debts if they are able. A continuing ﬁrm chooses its capital stock
and debt for the next period, K0 and B0, subject to the constraints described above.
These also determine the interest rate, r0 at which B0 is contracted. We can thereforeFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 8
write the ﬁrms’ problem in recursive form as follows,




























subject to (1), and (2),
where θ−1 represents the value of the productivity shock in the previous period and
Ω(θ) represents the value of the outside option. Alternatively, since θ (and therefore
the value of x) is realized before the investment and borrowing decisions are made,
we can rewrite the state variables as x and θ. The value function can therefore be
expressed as


















subject to (1) and (2)
where b V (θKα +( 1− δ)K − (1 + r(K,B,θ−1))B,θ)=V (K,B,θ,θ−1).
We now characterize the value of the outside option Ω(θ) and the debt contract
in more detail. One possibility is to normalize Ω(θ)=0 , which implies that the ﬁrm
will stay in the industry until the value of continuing is zero. Another possibility is
to allow for transferability of the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic productivity to another activity.
Here we assume that the ﬁrm follows the latter course and Ω(θ)=b V (0,θ). In other
words, the ﬁrm will exit when it is unable to pay its current liabilities (since debt is
one period, all liabilities are current) out of its existing assets, namely the value of
production and capital stock. In this event, the ﬁrm defaults on its debt.9 Deﬁne θ
9We rule out the possibility of the ﬁrm defaulting and staying in the same business, an event that
we do not observe in our data. The value of production and undepreciated capital in this situation
goes to pay bankruptcy costs and cannot be appropriated by the lender or by the ﬁrm. The value
of Ω(θ) can be non negative because the ﬁrm is able to transfer its productivity to other activities.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 9





0−α − (1 − δ)K
01−α
T h e nt h ee x i tr u l ei m p l i e st h a t
if θ
0 ≥ θ
0, the ﬁrm stays;
if θ
0 < θ
0 the ﬁrm exits.








and Φ(.) is the area under the standard normal curve. Since
θ
0
K0 = −(1 + r
0)αK
0−α−1B
0 − (1 − δ)(1− α)K
0−α < 0,a n d
θ
0
B0 =( 1 + r
0)K
0−α > 0,
the survival probability at time t0, conditional on surviving the previous period is
positively related to the amount of capital the ﬁrm has at this time K0, and is in-
versely related to its debt liabilities B0. W ec a nt h e r e f o r et h i n ko ft h ee x i tr u l ea s
aC h a p t e r7b a n k r u p t c y ,w h e r eaﬁrm declares bankruptcy when it cannot meet its
debt obligations, and is allowed to keep “the tools of its trade”.10
















If survival were guaranteed, i.e. Φ(κ0)=0 ,r 0 = ρ. On the other hand, ﬁrms with
zero survival probability (Φ(κ0)=1 )f a c ea ni n ﬁnitely high rate of interest. The
derivatives of the interest rate over capital and debt are obtained using the implicit
function theorem. They are r0
K0 = θ
0
K0B0K0αΥ < 0,a n dr0
B0 = θ
0
B0B0K0αΥ > 0,w h e r e
10See Eraslan (2000) for a model of Chapter 11 bankruptcy where creditors negotiate the reorga-
nization of a ﬁrm after it is cannot meet its liabilities.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 10
Υ =
λ(κ0)B0K0α(1+r0)
1−λ(κ0)B0K0α(1+r0) ≥ 0,a n dλ(κ0)=
1
σφ(κ0)
1−Φ(κ0) > 0 is the inverse Mills’s ratio, which




The interest rate is therefore decreasing in capital and increasing in debt. The
intuition behind this result is very simple. More capital tomorrow will increase the
ﬁrms’ value and reduce the value of the outside option. Similarly, a larger amount of
debt will, other things equal, lower the probability of survival. Equation (3) therefore
gives us a supply schedule of debt faced by a ﬁrm. More details can be found in
Appendix A.1.
2.2 Optimal Policy











































+ ξ + ζ =0 ,
Lξ = x − K
0 + B
0 − D =0 ,
Lζ = B
0 =0 ,Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 11
where e EVj =
R
θ0>θ0 VjdP (θ





























































Proposition 1 ζ 6=0→ ξ =0Proof: In Appendix A.1.
This proposition asserts that a ﬁrm cannot simultaneously incur debt and issue
positive dividends. The intuition for this result is simple. If a ﬁrm borrows a dollar to
pay out as dividends, the cost it incurs is 1+r
1+ρ ≥ 1, whereas the beneﬁti s1. Hence a
ﬁrm will only borrow if the marginal beneﬁt is greater than the marginal cost, which
is only the case when the debt is used to ﬁnance capital stock. Proposition 1 implies
that there can be three possible regimes which can be summarized as follows
Regime I Regime II Regime III
ξξ > 0 ξ > 0 ξ =0
ζζ =0 ζ > 0 ζ > 0
xx < K ∗ (θ)+DK ∗∗ (θ) ≤ x − D<K ∗∗∗ (θ) x ≥ K∗∗∗ (θ)+D
K0(x,θ) K∗(x,θ) x − DK ∗∗∗ (θ)
K0
x > 01 0
B0(x,θ) K∗(x,θ) − x + D 00
B0
x K0
x − 10 0Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 12
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In Appendix A.3. we show that capital is increasing in x in regime I. In all three





0(x,θ) − x + D,0
¢
.




The three regimes can be described as follows: In the ﬁrst regime, ﬁrms have
relatively low ﬁnancial resources and contract debt. By proposition 1 we know that a
ﬁrm will never borrow to pay out dividends, hence it must be accumulating capital.
It is also hitting the lower limit on dividends. The slope of K0 with respect to x is
therefore positive and greater than 1 when debt is increasing and less than 1 when
debt is decreasing. In regime II, the ﬁrm is able to accumulate capital completely
out of its own internal resources and will therefore not borrow. It could however
issue equity if D<0. In this case, the ﬁrm is spending its entire internal resources
on capital accumulation and the slope of K0 with respect to x is 1. The dividend
constraint is binding. In regime III, the ﬁrm has reached the steady state of capital.
Notice that the capital stock in this case depends only on the parameters of the model
a n di sn o taf u n c t i o no fx. In this case, further increases in x will not induce the ﬁrmFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 13
to increase its capital stock. It will also issue dividends if x>K ∗∗∗ (θ).
To illustrate some properties of the model, we present simulations of the policy
rules.11 Figure 1 and 2 present cross sections of the policy functions for K0 and B0 as
af u n c t i o no fx for diﬀerent values of θ. For a given value of θ,t h eﬁrms’ capital stock
is positively related to x for ﬁrms with low x (regime I and II). For high x,i nr e g i m e
III, where the dividend constraint is not binding, the policy function is a horizontal
line, i e. K0 is not sensitive to x.12 Higher values of θ, which improve the proﬁtability
of the ﬁrm, shifts this policy function upwards.
Similarly, the policy rule for debt shows an inverted U shape. In this model, debt
is a double-edged sword. For a given productivity, ﬁrms need to borrow to invest and
this increases their expected proﬁts. On the other hand, it also leaves them more
vulnerable to bad shocks and increases the probability of exit. The policy function of
debt reﬂects these two opposing tendencies. Initially increases in x, by allowing ﬁrms
to increase their capital stock, also lower the interest rate. This allows the ﬁrm to
borrow and to accumulate capital, and x and B0 display the positive relationship we
observe. However as a ﬁrm grows wealthier, its need to borrow to accumulate capital
becomes smaller and is outweighed by the risks of default. B0 declines, creating the
inverted U shape that we observe. Higher values of θ reduce the prospect of future
bankruptcy, allowing the ﬁrm to borrow larger amounts and shift the policy rule up.
11The parameter values used in this simulation are α =0 .6, ρ =0.02, δ =0.12, γ =0 .8,µ=0 .5,
σ =1 .05. D is assumed to be 0. The numerical solution is computed for assigned parameter values by
discretizing the state space (all possible combinations of K and B and θ) into a grid of points. This
g i v e su sad i s c r e t es t a t es p a c ef o rx as well. Starting with an arbitrary initial magnitude for V0,t h e
value function is maximized with respect to K and B, subject to the constraints mentioned above,
to get the policy functions for capital and debt associated with V0. Using these policy functions, a
new value function is computed. The expectation of the value function is computed by discretizing
the probability distribution of θ and integrating it over all permissible values of θ. This process is
repeated until the value function converges. Further details of the discretization and the solution
technique are given in Appendix B.
12Note that there is no reason for the policy function to start at zero, i.e. K0(0,θ) and B0(0,θ)
can be greater than zero for a suﬃciently high level of θ.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 14
The slope of the policy function can be represented as
∂b V
∂x








For a ﬁrm which has either of the constraints binding, this slope is clearly greater
than 1. In particular, Υ is positive if B>0, that is, in regime I. In regimes II and III
also, ∂b V
∂x > 1, that is, even in parts of regime III, the ﬁrm is constrained, because of
the expectation of hitting the dividend constraint next period. It is decreasing in x,
as shown in Figure 3. For a liquidity constrained ﬁrm, given a level of productivity θ,
an increment to x represents not only an increase in wealth, but also an opportunity
to increase its capital stock. Firms which are closer to their desired level of capital
place a lower value on x, as shown by the declining slope. When liquidity constraints
are not binding the slope of the value function approaches 1. At this point, the value
of an additional unit of resources within the ﬁrm is the same as the value of a unit of
resources outside the ﬁrm. Higher values of θ shift the curve out since an additional
unit of capital obtained by investing x is more productive, thus giving the ﬁrm a
higher value.
The dividends of the ﬁrm can be written as






In this particular example, we have parametrized D to be zero. Hence, as Figure 4
illustrates, ﬁrms with low x which are not at their desired level of capital do not pay
any dividends. Only ﬁrms with high ﬁnancial resources that reach their desired level
capital will issue dividends.
We therefore see that this model delivers results which are consistent with several
stylized facts of ﬁrm investment and ﬁnancial behavior. If we are willing to identify
“small ﬁrms” with low x ﬁrms, we see that small ﬁrms pay fewer dividends, invest
more, and take on more debt (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, Hall and HallFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 15
1993). They also have a higher probability of exit (Evans 1987, Hall 1987). Investment
of small ﬁrms is also more sensitive to changes in cash ﬂow, while this relation is weaker
for large ﬁrms.(See for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, Gilchrist and
Himmelberg 1994, 1998).
2.3 The dividend constraint

















1+ρ − (1 − δ)
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If there were no dividend constraint, we would not have the three regimes, but just
one with ξ =0a ta l lt i m e s ,t h a ti s ,w i t he Eξ











α(γθ+ µ + σλ(κ0))





We have an implicit deﬁnition of capital that only depends on parameters and on
a predetermined productivity θ. The dividend constraint that mimics this result is
e D(θ)=−K0
nd (θ).A tt h i sp o i n taﬁrm can always attain its optimal level of capital
stock, even if x =0 .13 Any constraint D(θ) ≤ e D(θ) will be redundant; hence, a
constraint will only bind if D(θ) > e D(θ).L e t D(θ)=se D(θ), s ∈ [0,1] is then a
measure of the tightness of the dividend constraint.
Proposition 2 (i) If s ≥ 1,t h e nK∗∗∗ (θ)=Knd (θ). (ii) If s<1,t h e nK∗∗∗ (θ) >
sKnd (θ). Proof: In Appendix A.2.
Notice that the sign of K∗∗∗ (θ) − Knd (θ) is ambiguous as the sign of e E (θ
0ξ
0) is
ambiguous in spite of e Eξ
0 > 0. The fear of a binding constraint in the future may
13Notice that allowing ﬁrms to borrow as much as they wish at the risk free rate would not mimic
this result because of the exit rule. Fear of bankruptcy would precent ﬁrms from borrowing large
amounts to reach this value of capital.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 16
induce an overaccumulation of capital in the current period.
Proposition 3 If s ≥ (<)1,t h e nB0 (x,θ)=( ≥)0, K0






Proof: In Appendix A.2.
Without liquidity constraints (s ≥ 1)t w oﬁrms with the same productivity level
but diﬀerent ﬁnancial position have the same expected path of future state variables.
The ﬁrm with the lower x will be able to make up the shortfall by issuing as much
equity as it needs, without incurring in debt and without capital stock being sensitive
to x. With liquidity constraints (s<1)t h e s et w oﬁr m sw i l lh a v ed i ﬀerent expected
paths. This is the basis of our identiﬁcation of liquidity constraints in Subsection 4.1.
Figures 5 and 6 show the policy rules for capital and debt according to the tightness
of the dividend constraint. For s =0 .5, we see that the eﬀect of the constraint is not
identical for all ﬁrms. Smaller ﬁrms are able to accumulate more, and than in the case
of s =0 . On the other hand, the steady state value of capital is lower with s =0 .5,
suggesting that when s =0 , ﬁrms also have a precautionary motive in accumulating
capital. Debt is always lower in this case since ﬁrms have another costless source of
funds.
It is worth noting that this formulation of liquidity constraints assumes a very
special structure of the costs of issuing equity. If dividends are negative but greater
than D(θ), this implies that the ﬁrm is able to issue equity (negative dividends) cost-
lessly. On the other hand, issuing equity beyond D(θ) has an inﬁnite cost. Another
possibility is to assume an exogenous cost structure for equity as in Gomes (2001).
However, from an estimation point of view the parameters of this function would not
be identiﬁed with our data. We therefore choose to go with this approach.
3D a t a
The data used in this estimation are from the Standard & Poor Industrial Compustat
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heterogeneity, other than the ﬁrm speciﬁc shock, we try to reduce systematic diﬀer-
ences between ﬁrms by using data from a single 2 digit industry group. Our dataset
consists of a sample of 89 ﬁrms from the fabricated metals, machinery and transport
equipment sector (SIC 34). This is not a balanced panel and we have many missing
observations. The data used and their deﬁnitions from Compustat are
Investment (I): Capital Expenditure on Property , Plant and Equipment;
Capital Stock (BK): Beginning Balance of the Year’s Capital Stock (Book Value);
Borrowing (B): Debt in Current Liabilities.
The frequency of the data is yearly and all quantities are in millions of dollars. A ﬁrm
is included in the sample if it has data on investment and debt continuously for ten or
more years. Firms which report zero capital stock for one or more years in the sample
period are not included. The replacement value of capital stock is constructed using
the perpetual inventory method, using the ﬁrst observed book value of capital stock to
initialize the series. Firms for which this initial observation of capital stock is missing
are excluded from the sample. We also remove outliers following a method used by
Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995). Further details of sample selection and construction
of the replacement value of capital stock are given in Appendix C.
[Table 1 about here]
Average investment, borrowing and capital stock of the pooled data are given in
Table 1. Firms have a mean yearly investment of roughly $17 million, and debt of
$13 million. Kt refers to the book value of capital stock for each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst year
that it is observed. This initial average is about $100 million. However, the data
are widely dispersed, i.e. the standard deviations (especially for capital stock) are all
large.
We also carried out some reduced form estimations14 which show that the dy-
14T h er e s u l t so ft h e s ee s t i m a t i o n sa r ea v a i l a b l eo nr e q u e s tf r o mt h ea u t h o r s .Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 18
namic model predicted relationships between capital and debt are borne out in the
data. These estimations are of course not suﬃcient to quantify the magnitude of the
liquidity constraints.
4 Estimation
We now turn to the estimation to recover the parameters of the structural model. We
use the policy rules obtained from the solution of the dynamic programming problem
as inputs into the computation of a likelihood function. The estimation consists of
ﬁnding the parameters which maximize the probability of observing the data, given
the structural model.
4.1 Identiﬁcation
The basic source of identiﬁcation of the seven structural parameters of the model is
the individual ﬁrm’s evolution of capital and debt. In particular, the debt data are
crucial for identifying those parameters that are not part of the stochastic process,
namely α,δ,ρ,s.
If there is no dividend constraint, that is, s ≥ 1, we can directly assume that
s =1 ,a sa n ys>1 produces exactly the same policy rule as s =1 ,a se x p l a i n e d
above. In this case debt must be zero at all times and capital is given by equation (6).
In this implicit equation α,δ,ρ are identiﬁed by its functional form. If ﬁrms did not







. Consequently, to guarantee identiﬁcation, we do not estimate
α,δ,a n dρ if s =1 .
If s is estimated, that is, if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,w ea l s oc o n s t r a i nα,δ,a n dρ.T h a t w a y
s =1is identiﬁed and becomes also an admissible value for an estimate. As stated in
Proposition 3, s<1 implies that B0 > 0 in regime I, and B0 =0in regimes II and III.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 19








where capital K0 is deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) . S i n c ew ea r eﬁxing α,δ,a n dρ,f r o m
these two equations we can identify the parameters of the stochastic process, γ,µ,σ,
and with them, we can determine Knd. The tightness of the dividend constraint s is
then recovered from the debt equation. In regimes II and III, B0 =0 , so the dividend
constraint implies K
0 ≤ θKα +( 1− δ)K − (1 + ρ) B
1−Φ(κ) + sKnd.In regime II this
condition holds with equality, so identiﬁcation of s is similar as in regime I. In regime
III this condition holds with strict inequality, which gives an upper threshold for an
admissible level of capital. Consequently, identiﬁcation of s comes primarily from
regime I and II, that is, when the dividend constraint is binding.
If s =0 ,i d e n t i ﬁcation is similar as in the previous cases; however, the debt
equation and equation (5) allow us to additionally identify α,δ,ρ and the parameters
of the stochastic process of productivity.
We perform several estimations for diﬀerent levels of tightness of the dividend
constraint. We estimate α,δ,ρ in the speciﬁcation s =0 , and take them as given in the
other speciﬁcations to estimate the remaining parameters. We check for robustness
by reestimating the model with values of α,δ,ρ that are commonly used in calibration
exercises.
Since some speciﬁcations of the model, like s =1 , imply zero debt at all times,
to avoid zero probability events we include measurement error in debt at all periods.
As we do not observe initial productivity, we try to infer its value from the ﬁrst
observation of capital and debt. For that we need to add measurement error in initial
capital. We further test for the impact of this error by reestimating the model with
a restricted variance on the measurement error of capital.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 20
4.2 Log-Likelihood function
The log-likelihood function is the sum of the log of each ﬁrm’s joint density of the



















This multivariate density can be split into the product of conditional densities. We
can construct a likelihood function for the whole evolution of observables, integrating
out the unobservable productivity shock. In our case, the observables and unob-
servables are serially correlated, which complicates the construction of the likelihood
function by requiring several integrations.
For the ﬁrst observation we know the levels of capital and debt, Kobs
1 ,Bobs
1 ,b u tw e
do not know the associated productivity level θ1,n o rd ow ek n o wr or θ0 (to improve
legibility, we omit subscripts for individual ﬁrms). However, using the policy rules
K (x,θ) and B (x,θ) we can determine the density for a certain θ0 in the previous
period given K1 and B1. A complication in inverting these policy rules is that the
same capital and debt can be the result of several diﬀerent combinations of x and θ.15
In case of multiple solutions we assume that each of these combinations is equally
likely. We ﬁrst build the indicator function
I (K1,B 1|x0,θ0)=1 ,i fK1 = K
0 (x0,θ0) and B1 = B
0 (x0,θ0),
=0 , otherwise.
The density for the productivity level, conditional on capital and debt in the ﬁrst
15This is because of the ﬂat portion of the policy rule in regime III. Additionally, the discretization
of the state space can collapse two originallly diﬀerent levels of capital or of debt into the same
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period is given by
w(θ0|K1,B 1)=
R
I (K1,B 1|x,θ0)dx RR
I (K1,B 1|x,θ)dxdθ
,
that is, the set of all values of θ0 that produce the combination K1,B 1 divided over
all possible combinations of x,θ that produce K1,B 1. Appendix D describes the dis-
cretized version of this inversion, which is the one used in the actual computation. To
facilitate the computation of this inverse we introduce (normally distributed) classical
measurement error in the ﬁrst observation of capital . As mentioned above, to avoid
collapse of the likelihood function when s is close to zero, we also add measurement
error in debt at all times. Hence the observed level of capital is deﬁned as the model
predicted level of capital plus a normally distributed white noise: Kobs = K + εK,
εK ∼ N (0,σ2
K). Similarly the observed level of debt is the model predicted level plus
the error term: Bobs = B + εB, εB ∼ N (0,σ2
B). This way, the observables do not
need to coincide with their predicted levels. Instead of becoming zero, the likelihood
value will decrease the higher the distance between the predicted levels of capital and
debt and their empirical counterparts. The density for the ﬁrst predicted levels of


































For the subsequent observations, we have a density function which is constructed
with the densities of the measurement errors for capital and for debt. If we know
(Kt,B t,θt,θt−1), Kt+1 and Bt+1 are fully determined, which means that observed
levels of investment and debt will have either probability one or zero. Adding mea-
surement error to debt smooths out the likelihood function. Instead of one and zero,
we have a density that increases as the distance between predicted and observed levels
falls. Consequently, to compute the joint density distribution of true variables and
observables, we include the density of the process for productivity and the density of
16We drop ﬁrm subscripts to economize on notation here.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 22

























t = Kt+1 (Kt,B t,θt,θt−1) − (1 − δ)Kt,
=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
With these conditional densities, we construct the density for the whole sequence of
investment and debt. The individual likelihood contribution for the whole sequence
of investment and debt conditional on the ﬁrst observation is a product of densities































The integration is performed over all admissible values of (θ0,θ1,....,θT), i.e. values
of θ that imply K and B which do not violate the exit rule and other constraints.
This is explained in greater detail in Appendix D.
The likelihood value for the whole sample is then computed using expression (7).
The set of parameters to be estimated therefore is Θ = {α,δ,ρ,σ,µ,γ,s}∪{σK,σB}
where the ﬁrst set is the set of behavioral parameters of the model and the second
set is the parameters of the measurement error distributions.
Notice that in the likelihood function γ,µ,σ enter as parameters of the process as
well as inside the policy rules. These parameters are identiﬁed by the transitions of
capital and debt period by period. As mentioned above, the other parameters of the
structural model are identiﬁed mainly by debt and aﬀect only the set of admissible
values for observed capital and debt.
For the computation of this likelihood function,we exploit the discretization of
the variables as described in Appendix B. The likelihood function is maximized using
the Powell algorithm (Press, Teutolsky & Vetterling 1992) which uses direction setFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 23
methods to ﬁnd the maximum. This algorithm relies on functional evaluations, not
gradient methods.
4.3 Results
We estimate several versions of the model, the results of which are presented in
Table 2. Asymptotic standard errors are calculated using the OPG estimator and
provided in parenthesis below.
[Table 2 about here]
The ﬁrst column represents the estimation of the model with full liquidity con-
straints, i.e. when s =0 . As discussed in the previous subsection, all parameters are
identiﬁed in this case. Since capital is the only factor of production in the model, we
would expect an α of almost 1. However, the presence of the measurement errors,
which throw a distribution around each initial permissible value of capital reduces α
to 0.6. The discount rate ρ is estimated to be about 6% which is quite consistent
with the average post war interest rates. The persistence parameter of the AR(1)
shock γ is estimated to be about 0.94. The idiosyncratic shock each period has a
mean of 0.33 and a standard deviation of 0.21. This implies that the shock has a high
degree of persistence and that heterogeneity between ﬁr m si sa ni m p o r t a n tf a c t o r
in explaining diﬀerences in behavior. The depreciation rate δ is estimated at 0.09,
which is somewhat smaller than the Hulten-Wykoﬀ estimate for this sector of 0.12.
σK is extremely large implying a large measurement error in the initial observation
of capital. The capital stock series for a ﬁrm has been initialized using the book
value of capital stock. The diﬀerence between the book and the economic value is,
at least partially responsible for the measurement error. The standard deviation of
the measurement error in debt is relatively small. The asymptotic standard errors of
all parameters in this speciﬁcation are small, suggesting a high degree of precision in
our estimates.
The second column estimates the model with s as a free parameter. We useFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 24
the estimates of α,ρ and δ from the previous column and estimate the remaining
parameters including s. As mentioned in the previous section, when s =1 , α,ρ and
δ are not identiﬁed. To allow for the possibility of s being equal to 1,w ed on o t
estimate these parameters. This speciﬁcation returns an estimate of s of around 0.73.
The other parameters, namely the mean, variance and the persistence parameter
of the stochastic process are relatively similar to the previous column. A notable
exception is the standard deviation on the measurement error of debt, which is much
lower. The likelihood value is also signiﬁcantly higher than in the previous case.
Finally, the third column presents estimates of the model without any liquidity
constraints, i.e. with s restricted to be 1. The estimates of α,ρ and δ are again taken
from the ﬁrst column. The parameters are again quite similar to the ﬁrst column,
although the somewhat lower value of the likelihood function suggests that the model
does not ﬁt the data as well.
The rows marked LRs=0 represents the likelihood ratio statistic from a test of
the null hypothesis of s =0against the alternate of s 6=0 .17As we can see, the
null hypothesis is strongly rejected. Similarly LRs=1 represents the likelihood ratio
statistic for testing the null that s =1 . Again, this null hypothesis is rejected.
One potential cause of concern is the magnitude of the measurement error on
the initial observation of capital. To investigate whether this is driving our results,
we estimated the next three columns, restricting the measurement error to have a
standard deviation of 15.18 The results of this estimation are in columns (4), (5)
and (6). In column (4), which is the model with s =0 , the estimate for α is very
similar to that in column 1. The risk free rate ρ is slightly higher, as is δ and
the mean and variance of the shock. This suggests that some variability in capital
17The models considered in this test (column (1) and column (2)) are not nested. However,
imposing the estimated values of α,ρ and δ on the model of column (1) and estimating the remaining
parameters gives us the same result as if we freely estimate all parameters. This implies that the
ﬁrst model diﬀeres from the second only in that s is restricted to be 0.
18Given the discretization of the capital stock, this is equivalent to restricting true capital to be
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which was previously accounted for by σK is now being accounted for by σ². The
measurement error in debt is also slightly higher. The likelihood value is substantially
lower, suggesting that the high measurement error in capital helps provide a better
ﬁt to the data. Similarly in column (5) the estimate of s is not changed by the
restriction on the measurement error. Again, δ,µ are somewhat higher than in the
previous case, and σ² is substantially higher. Similar results obtain in Column (6)
where s is restricted to be 1. The likelihood ratio tests show that the null hypotheses
of s =0and s =1are both rejected.
Another cause of concern is that the estimation of s =0 .73 could be dependent on
the values of the parameters α, ρ and δ which have been imposed to identify them. To
check for the robustness of this result, we take the value of α, ρ and δ used in Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) to calibrate their model and estimate the other parameters. The
results are presented in columns (7) and (8). Column (7) shows that the value of s is
virtually unchanged. Restricting the measurement error in capital however, changes
the value of s to 0.34. However, it is very clear that this value is neither zero, nor
one, suggesting that some degree of liquidity constraints do exist.
5 Comparison of the Model with the Data
The analysis in the previous section suggests that the best ﬁt for the data is provided
by the speciﬁcation in Column (2) of Table 2, i.e. where the degree of liquidity
constraints are estimated. We therefore subject this model to further scrutiny to
assess the goodness of ﬁt. Using the parameters estimated we simulate time paths
for capital and debt for 89 ﬁrms for 20 years. Figures 7 and 8 show the actual and
predicted time paths for capital stock and debt in this model.
As we can see from Figure 7, the predicted values of average capital stock are
much larger than actual data in the initial ﬁve or six years of the simulation. After
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is that in the initial periods, small ﬁrms tend to accumulate capital and there seems
to be some overshooting. Large ﬁrms are more stable in size. Once ﬁrms converge
to their steady state, we have a better ﬁt of the data.Another reason could be the
absence of any frictions (such as adjustment costs) other than the ﬁnancial frictions
in our model. Towards the end of the sample period, the actual and predicted values
of capital stock converge.
Figure 8 shows the predicted path of debt as compared to the actual path. As
i nt h ep r e v i o u sp i c t u r e ,t h em o del overpredicts the level of debt initially. This over-
prediction can be explained jointly with the overprediction of capital stock for those
years. By 1988, the model predicted and the data series are much closer and also
move together. This is analogous to what happens to capital.
5.1 Goodness of Fit Tests
We perform goodness of ﬁt tests to measure the distance between the observed and
model predicted distributions of capital and debt. A χ2 statistic provides cell-by-cell
information on whether the observed data comes from the probability distribution
implied by the theoretical model. Let njt be the actual number of observations of
choice j at time t and ˆ njt be the model predicted counterpart. The simplest test
statistic across choices j at time t is deﬁned as χ2 = ΣJ
j=1
(njt−ˆ njt)2
ˆ njt ,w h e r eJ is the
total number of possible choices and T is the number of years. χ2 has an asymptotic
χ2 distribution with J − 1 degrees of freedom.
We divide capital stock and debt into ﬁve bins each to conduct this test. These
categories are basically a contracted version of the discrete state space,19 chosen to
correspond to the actual distribution of capital stock and debt in the data.
The χ2 statistic is presented in Table 3. The statistic for the ﬁrst year is zero
because the model predicted distribution is generated using the ﬁrst observation on
19For capital the categories are: 0-200, 200-400, 400-600, 600-800, ≥ 800 million dollars. For debt,
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capital and debt in the data which makes the two distributions identical for the
initial year. As was obvious even from the simple graphical comparison, the ﬁtf o r
the subsequent ﬁve years for capital is not very good. Thereafter the statistic is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level of signiﬁcance for every year except 1984.20 Similarly the
χ2 statistic for debt is not signiﬁcant for 1977, but the ﬁti m p r o v e sf o rt h es u b s e q u e n t
two years. The statistic is not signiﬁcant for the period of 1980 to 1984, but it is
always signiﬁcant after 1984.
[Table 3 about here]
It should be noted that our criterion for testing goodness of ﬁti sp a r t i c u l a r l y
stringent. If the model does not ﬁta tt i m et,t h eﬁta tt +1is even more diﬃcult
to obtain since the variables are related. In general, we would expect structural
models to perform worse than reduced form models in goodness of ﬁtt e s t ss i n c et h e
former make far greater demands on the data than the latter. The clear advantage of
structural models over reduced form models is that they allow us to conduct policy
experiments.
6 Policy Experiments
We are now in a position to use the parameters we have estimated to quantify the
importance of liquidity constraints for ﬁrm investment. This is done with the help of
two policy experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment we assess the eﬀect of relaxing the
dividend constraint. As a baseline, we use the parameters from the second column
o fT a b l e2t os i m u l a t et h et i m ep a t h so fc a p i t a lf o ra l lﬁrms. We then simulate the
time path of capital for diﬀerent values of s and compare these time paths to the
baseline. This gives us an idea of the importance of the dividend constraint in terms
of investment forgone.
The second policy experiment is designed to quantify the eﬀect of the “ﬁnancial
20The critical value in both cases is 9.49 at the 5% level of signiﬁcance and 11.14 at the 99% level.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 28
accelerator”, namely the changes in capital stock as a result of transitory changes
in the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position. We study the response of ﬁrms to a transitory 1%
change in the risk free rate. This raises the cost of borrowing for one period, but does
not aﬀect the subsequent periods. The transitory shock does not aﬀect ﬁrms who do
not have a dividend constraint, i.e. for whom s =1because their investment is not
sensitive to their ﬁnancial position.
6.1 Relaxing the Dividend Constraint
As mentioned earlier, the eﬀect of changing s is not uniform for all ﬁrms. While
increasing s allows small ﬁrms to accumulate more capital on one hand, it also reduces
the need for precautionary capital accumulation on the other. Hence when s =1 ,
ﬁrms with low x will accumulate more and ﬁrms with high x will accumulate less as
compared to when s<1.
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4. We simulate capital stocks
for s =0 ,s=0 .73 and s =1 . Additionally, Figure 9, 10 and 11 compare the average
capital stock for all, small and large ﬁrms respectively for s =0 .73 and s =1 . Small
ﬁrms are deﬁned as ﬁrms with less than an initial value of capital of $100 million.
[Table 4 about here]
As Figure 9 shows, ﬁrms with s =1are able to accumulate more capital than
ﬁrms with s =0 .73 in the initial 10 years. Five years after we begin the simulation,
the diﬀerence in capital stock is about $14 million or 8%. This diﬀerence narrows as
ﬁrms reach their steady state. Within ten years, the diﬀerence is halved to $7 million
or 4% and by the ﬁfteenth year it disappears. Over a period of 20 years, the average
eﬀect of increasing s from 0.73 to 1.0 is about 6.07%.
A very similar pattern is observed when we look at the accumulation of small
ﬁrms (Figure 10). A relatively wide initial divergence (about $12 million in the ﬁfth
year of the simulation) narrows to $7 million ten years after we start the simulation.
By the ﬁfteenth year, this gap has disappeared. The overall diﬀerence in capital stockFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 29
for small ﬁr m si sa b o u t7 % .
The behavior of large ﬁr m si sh o w e v e rd i ﬀerent. In the initial years capital stock
in the s =1case is higher than in the benchmark case. However this relationship gets
reversed about six years after the simulation begins when most ﬁrms have reached
their desired level of capital. In the ﬁfth year of the simulation, ﬁrms with unrestricted
dividends have on the average, capital stock of $2 million dollars more than those with
s restricted to 0.73. However, by the tenth year, their capital stock falls to $1.5 million
less than the benchmark ﬁrms. The overall diﬀerence for 20 years is about 2%.
Turning now to the comparison of the average capital stock of ﬁrms with s =0 , i.e.
full liquidity constraints and s =0 .73 we see that the former have signiﬁcantly lower
average capital stock than the latter. Over the 20 year period, this averages to about
9% for all ﬁrms. For small and large ﬁrms, the ﬁgure is 10% and 3.6% respectively for
the entire period. Table 4 also shows that a large part of this diﬀerence is accounted
for in the ﬁrst ﬁve years. For small ﬁrms this is about $20 million or 13% of the total
capital stock. This reduces to about 7% within 10 years and to about 1% by 15 years.
For large ﬁrms, the corresponding ﬁgures are an 8% diﬀerence for the ﬁfth year. By
the tenth year, the capital stocks of both types of ﬁrms are very similar.
Thus we see that relaxing the dividend constraint has substantial consequences
for the accumulation of capital stock. However, a simple relaxation of the dividend
constraint is not enough to increase investment. While ﬁrms with low x increase their
capital, the capital accumulation of large ﬁrms is lower than in the benchmark case.
In a sample dominated by large ﬁrms therefore, it is conceiv a b l et h a tt h er e l a x a t i o n
of this constraint could actually cause a decline in overall capital stock. Our sample
mainly consists of small ﬁrms and so the net eﬀect of relaxing the constraint is positive.
6.2 Transitory Changes in x
As mentioned before, the second experiment consists of increasing the risk free rate
by 1% in the ﬁrst period of the simulation and allowing it to go back to its estimatedFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 30
value subsequently. However we do not change the discount rate, so this experiment
leaves the fundamentals of the ﬁrm unaltered. Since this transitory change reduces
x, we would expect K0 to decline for ﬁrms whose capital stock is sensitive to their
ﬁnancial position.
Figure 12 shows the eﬀe c to ft h i se x e r c i s eo nﬁrms whose dividends are partially
constrained by s =0 .73. The dotted line shows the impact on small ﬁrms (deﬁned
as in the previous section) and the solid line on large ﬁrms. As we can see from the
graph, the eﬀects of a transitory shock to interest rates can be felt for 8 subsequent
periods for small ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst period after the shock, capital stock reduces by
2.8% and in the second period by 3%. In the ﬁfth period after the shock, the reduction
in capital stock is of the order of 1.5% and in the eight year it is 0.6% before going
down to zero. For large ﬁrms, the eﬀect of this transitory shock is smaller and less
persistent, in fact it peters out by the sixth period after the shock.
This transitory shock has no eﬀect on ﬁrms which are allowed to issue unlimited
equity, i.e. when s =1 . Ar e d u c t i o ni nx as a result of the rise in interest rates is
compensated for by an increase in equity and the ﬁrms are able to maintain the same
levels of capital stock as before.
Hence we see that in our model, we are able to capture the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial
accelerator on ﬁrms’ investment. The presence of liquidity constraints ampliﬁes small
shocks to ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position, leading to persistent changes in capital stock.
These changes are greater and last longer for smaller ﬁr m sa sc o m p a r e dt ol a r g e r
ﬁrms. These shocks have no eﬀect on ﬁrms who do not operate under these liquidity
constraints and are allowed to issue fresh equity, since the reduction in internal funds
can be made up by external funds.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 31
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We set up a dynamic model of ﬁrm investment which incorporates liquidity con-
straints into a ﬁrm’s decision making process. We ﬁnd that investment is positively
related to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position when it has a low level of internal funds. This
relationship disappears once the ﬁrm reaches its desired level of capital stock and
further improvements in its ﬁnancial position do not induce additional investment.
Borrowing initially increases with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position. However, as its capital
stock moves closer to the desired level, debt falls. Thereafter, the ﬁrm maintains a
very low level of borrowing, regardless of the value of its ﬁnancial position.
Our model allows us to test of the degree of liquidity constraints as a restriction on
the lower bound on the dividends that a ﬁrm pays out. We estimate this model using
the ﬁrms’ decision rule as an input into the likelihood function. While our estimates
reject the speciﬁcations of total constraints and no constraints, they do suggest that
ﬁrms operate under some degree of liquidity constraints.
Goodness of ﬁt tests show that the model is able to predict the path of capital
stock for the latter part of the sample well, in the initial period, it overestimates the
amount of capital a ﬁrm accumulates. This is also true for debt.
With these parameter estimates it is possible to quantify the importance of the
liquidity constraint for capital accumulation. Relaxing the non negativity of the
dividend constraint completely allows ﬁrms to accumulate, on the average, 6% more
capital as compared to the case where dividends are partially constrained. If we
compare ﬁrms whose dividends are constrained to be non-negative to those whose
dividends are constrained partially, we ﬁnd that the latter are able to accumulate, on
the average, about 9% more capital than the former.
The presence of liquidity constraints also ampliﬁes and propagates small negative
shocks to the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial position. A transitory shock to the ﬁnancial position
of small ﬁrms which are not allowed to issue equity, reduces capital for 8 subsequent
periods. For large ﬁrms the eﬀect is smaller and less persistent. However this shockFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 32
has no impact on ﬁrms which have no limits on issuing fresh equity because the
reduction in internal funds can be compensated for by external funds.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 33
Appendix A
A.1. Endogenous interest rate
The interest rate solves G(r0)=0 , which may not yield a unique solution for r0 given K0,














When there are multiple solutions, competition between lenders will lead to the lowest of
these rates. Since G(ρ)=−Φ(κ0) < 0,i fa tl e a s to n ee q u i l i b r i u mr a t ee x i s t s ,t h e r ei sa
low value of r0, such that G0 (r0) ≥ 0,i m p l y i n g1 − Φ(κ0) ≥ 1
σφ(κ0) B0
K0α (1 + r0) and Υ > 0.
Using the implicit function G(r0) we obtain the derivatives of the interest rate function over
its arguments shown in Subsection 2.1.
A.2. Proofs of propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 From LB0
e EV2 + rB0 e EV4 = −(1 + ρ)
B0 = −(1 + ρ)
(1 − Φ(κ0))e Eξ0
rB0
³
1 − Φ(κ0)+ e Eξ0
´ < 0
Debt would be negative which is infeasible. So, a solution must hit at least one constraint
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2(i) We proceed inductively. Starting at an initial iteration at
n =0with K∗∗∗
0 (θ)=Knd (θ),t h e nξ0 =0 , for all x.T h e ne Eξ0 =0and e E (θ0ξ0)=0 ,
implying K∗∗∗
1 (θ)=Knd (θ). Consequently, K∗∗∗
1 (θ) − sKnd (θ) ≤ 0,a n da n yﬁrm with
x ≥ 0 can attain Knd (θ). The argument is repeated for all n>0, so the stationary policy
rule attained at n →∞is K∗∗∗ (θ)=Knd (θ).
(ii) Suppose that K∗∗∗ (θ) ≤ sKnd (θ), this means that K∗∗∗ (θ)−sKnd (θ) ≤ 0,s oa n yﬁrm
with x ≥ 0 will be in regime III. This means that ξ =0 ,t h u se Eξ =0and e E (θξ)=0 .T h i s
implies that K∗∗∗ (θ)=Knd (θ), which is not possible because s<1, contradicting thereby
the assumption
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3If s ≥ 1, K∗∗∗ (θ)=Knd (θ),a n da l lﬁrms are in regime III, so
the proposition holds.
If s<1,o n l yﬁrms with x ≥ K∗∗∗ (θ) − sKnd (θ) > 0 will be in regime III. Firms with
x<K ∗∗∗ (θ) − sKnd (θ) will be in regime I or II
A.3. Capital in Regime I
The ﬁrst order condition for capital can be written as





¢ e EV4 =0 ,
and its second derivative is
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at the maximum. Then using r0
K0 + r0












1 − Φ(κ0)+e Eξ0
´
> 0,
we obtain Kx =
LK0x





¢ e EV4 > (<,=)0.
B: Numerical Solution of the Model
As mentioned in the main body of the paper, the model is solved by value function iteration,





variable Grid of points Number
of gridpoints
xx (m); m =1 ,...,N x; Nx =5 0
θθ (s); s =1 ,...,N θ; Nθ =5 1
KK (i); i =1 ,...,N K; NK =5 0
BB (j); j =1 ,...,N B; NB =5 0
















where s0 =1 ,2,....Nθ and s =1 ,2,....Nθ. The grid size is ∆² = 6σ²
N² .
The numerical solution proceeds in the following steps










B(j)0K0α(i) − (1 − δ)K0(i)α−1|θ(s)
¢
− (1 + ρ)=0
In case of multiple solutions, we choose the smallest one. The solution r(i,j,s) gives us
the interest rate charged to a ﬁrm with a realized shock of θ(s) today who wishes to borrow
B0(j) and have capital stock K0(i) tomorrow. This also gives us the value of θ0(i,j,s), the
threshold value of the shock, below which the ﬁrm exits. This is the realization of the shock
θ0tomorrow, for a ﬁrm with capital stock K0 and debt B0 which will render it unable to pay
its obligations.
2. Starting with an initial value of the value function b V0(x(m),θ(s)),and deﬁning b Vn as
the nth iteration we construct
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where the following conditions must be satisﬁed
x(m0)=θ0(s0)K0(i)α +( 1− δ)K0(i) − (1 + r0)B0(j),
r0 = r0(i,j,s),
x(m) − K0(i)+B0(j) ≥ D
The ﬁrst of the above equations is simply the deﬁnition of x0. The second incorporates the
zero proﬁt condition for the banks and the last imposes the dividend constraint.21
This is done for all m =1 ,2,... Nx and s =1 ,2,.....,Nθ.
3. This process is repeated until the tolerance criterion ω is met, i.e.
max
¯ ¯ ¯b Vn(x(m),θ(s)) − b Vn−1(x(m),θ(s))
¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ω
4. The policy rules for capital K(m,s) and for debt B(m,s) are
K(x(m),θ(s)) = K∗(i)
B(x(m),θ(s)) = B∗(j)
where K∗(i) and B∗(j) are the argmax of Vn(x(m),θ(s)).
Appendix C: Data
C.1. Sample Selection
The data used are from Standard & Poor’s Industrial Compustat ﬁles for SIC code 34. Our
initial sample consisted of an unbalanced panel of 328 ﬁrms and 3088 observations over the
period 1976 to 1995 for which data on I and B were available. We discarded ﬁrms from the
sample if they has data for less than 10 years, zero book value of capital stock for any year,
a missing value of capital stock for the initial observation or if there were any gaps in the
data on Kand B. In addition, we also removed outliers using the method described below.
C.2. Rule for Removing Outliers
Following Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1995), we use this rule to eliminate ﬁrms who have
major changes in the value of their capital stock due to reasons other than changes in
investment. Under standard accounting procedures the gross book value of physical capital
BKt satisﬁes the following identity:
BKt = BKt−1 + It − Rt + Ot
where Ris retirements and O is other changes in property, plant and equipment which have
not been accounted for elsewhere. We exclude ﬁrms for which
|BKt − BKt−1 − It + Rt| ≥ 0.3BKt−1
in any year.
21D =0is straightforward to estimate. When D = −sKnd (θ),we ﬁrst compute Knd (θ)
for each value of θ by iterating on the value function without the dividend constraint till it
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C.3. Construction of Replacement Value of Capital Stock
We use the value of ﬁrm investment every year to construct a series for the replacement value
of capital stock. The series is initialized with the book value of capital for the ﬁrst year.
We use the perpetual inventory method for constructing capital stock. The replacement
value of capital stock Kt is deﬁned as
Kt =( 1− δ)Kt−1 + It
where Iis the ﬁrm’s investment for year t and δ is the depreciation rate. The value of δ
used is the Hulton-Wykoﬀ estimate for this industry group. Later, the estimated value of
δ is used to re construct the capital stock. The latter value is used for the chi square tests.
All data are previously deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator (1984=100). The table below
summarizes the information about data selection
Initial No. of ﬁrms 328
Firms with data for 10 or more years 128
Firms with capital stock > 0 for all years 124
Firms with initial value of K given 123
F i r m sw i t hn og a p si nI and B 118
Firms with no unexplained jumps in capital stock 89
Appendix D: Likelihood function
To construct the likelihood function, we exploit the discretization of the continuous variables
to solve the DP problem and compute the likelihood as a Markov chain (Rendón 1997). The
construction of this function requires multiple integrations, actually summations, which can
be simpliﬁed by a recursive computation. As we did with the Bellman equation, we exploit
the fact that the state variables can be written as x and θ.
As deﬁned in Appendix B, g(s0|s) is the probability of θ(s0) conditional on θ(s) (equa-
tion (9)); i0(m,s) and j0(m,s) are the policy rules for capital and debt, respectively, in
terms of the ordinals of K0(i0)(x(m),θ(s)) andB0(j0)(x(m),θ(s))- The discretized densities





















where iK indexes the discretized version of ²K and iB. indexes ²B σK and σB are the
standard deviations of ²K and ²B while ∆K denotes the grid size for capital and ∆B for
debt, respectively.
Since we construct the capital stock using data on investment and δ, the capital stock
will have to be reconstructed at each iteration with the new value of δ. This means that,
together with the state variables x(m) and θ(s) we have to keep track of capital stock at
each period. This is not needed for debt, whose value can be subsumed into that of x(m).
Let us deﬁne Λ(i,m,s)t as the joint probability of reaching capital K(i), ﬁnancial resources
x(m), and productivity θ(s) at time t and observing the past sequence of capital and debtFirm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 37
up to this point:










In the ﬁrst period we compute the discrete version of function w(θ0|K1,B 1).L e t
I (i1,j 1|m0,s 0)=1 ,i fi1 = i1 (m0,s 0),a n dj1 = j1 (m0,s 0)
=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .
The probability for the productivity level s0 given (i1,j 1) is then:
Pr(s0|i1,j 1)=
P




m I (i1,j 1|m,s)
Both summations go over the whole discretized state space, selecting only admissible values
for the originating combinations of x0 and θ0. We compute next the discrete version of
equation (8) using the state space x, θ, while keeping track of capital. Thus, the joint
probability of reaching capital K(i1), ﬁnancial resources x(m1) and shock θ(s1) conditional
on the ﬁrst observation of capital and debt is















In the right hand side, the expression inside the double summation is the joint probability of
a productivity levels s1 and s0 and of true levels of capital and debt i1,a n dj1, conditional on
observing K(iobs
1 ) and B(jobs
1 ). Since we only need to keep track of (i1,m 1,s 1), we integrate
over s0 and j1 .Starting oﬀ from this ﬁrst observation, Λ(i,m,s)t can be deﬁned recursively
in the following manner:















Λ(i0,m 0,s 0)t+1 is deﬁned analogously to Λ(i,m,s)t as the joint probability of reaching capital
K(i0), ﬁnancial resources x(m0) and productivity θ(s0) and observing the past sequence of
debt and capital at time t+1. For each value of the unobservables K(i),x (m) and θ(s),w e
have to compute the probability of moving to capital K0(i), debt B0(j) and shock θ(s0),and
assign them to the implied values of x(m0) ≥ 0. We include in this recursive computation
a measurement error for debt, not for capital. The likelihood contribution for ﬁrm n can
be computed by integrating Λ(i,m,s)Tl over all possible values of the unobservables x(m),




















Notice that the unobservable true values only intervene in the expressions to facilitate the
recursive computation of multiple integrals. At the end of the iteration, the likelihood
function is the probability of observing the data given certain parameter values.Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 38
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Table 1:
Mean Std. Deviation Maximum Minimum No. of Obs.
It 17.09 41.74 570.82 0.00 1485
Bt 12.92 39.63 496.49 0.00 1485
Kt 103.95 190.93 1023.64 0.39 89
Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors
Θ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
α 0.53401 0.53401 0.53151 0.53151 0.600
(0.1359) (0.0210)
ρ 0.06247 0.06247 0.07249 0.07249 0.040
(0.0251) (0.0082)
δ 0.08695 0.08695 0.09248 0.09248 0.070
(0.0292) (0.0106)
γ 0.93478 0.93547 0.93526 0.919608 0.91737 0.91732 0.82101 0.82138
(0.0116) (0.1109) (0.0688) (0.1674) (0.1641) (0.1642) (0.0934) (0.0344)
µ 0.33164 0.28189 0.281692 0.38441 0.45075 0.45129 0.49428 0.49469
(0.0740) (0.0267) (0.0237) (0.1391) (0.01268) (0.0186) (0.0190) (0.0521)
σ² 0.21345 0.16979 0.16981 0.30000 0.30065 0.30004 0.33366 0.33294
(0.0169) (0.0191) (0.0234) (0.0953) (0.0623) (0.0102) (0.0059) (0.0075)
σK 341.04015 302.94361 331.73238 15.00000 255.52567 15.00000
(47.6622) (52.2031) (38.5239) (54.60188)
σB 11.16525 1.82048 11.01284 12.71158 2.79773 7.36763 2.09673 2.07875
(0.6136) (0.1627) (0.5150) (0.2734) (0.09692) (0.13147) (0.1419) (0.0939)
s 0.00000 0.73140 1.00000 0.00000 0.73234 1.00000 0.71314 0.34366
(0.0348) (0.0127) (0.0450) (0.0294)
ln L -1554.156 -941.477 -1578.309 -4239.839 -2213.572 -3236.559 -1315.680 -6619.876
LRs=0 1225.36 4052.53
LRs=1 1273.66 2045.97
Obs 1483Firm Investment in Imperfect Capital Markets. Pratap & Rendon March 2002 42
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Table 4: Relaxing the Dividend Constraint
s =0 s =0 .73 s =1
Average Capital Stock
All Firms 166.05 181.42 192.69
Small Firms 157.92 173.70 185.46
Large Firms 194.89 201.32 205.36
Average Capital Stock 5th Year
All ﬁrms 164.28 184.46 198.78
Small Firms 162.05 182.45 194.25
Large Firms 198.81 214.33 216.98
Average Capital Stock 10th Year
All Firms 160.38 172.10 178.07
Small Firms 158.47 171.00 178.05
Large Firms 180.83 179.54 178.25
Average Capital Stock 15th Year
All Firms 171.65 173.08 173.08
Small Firms 168.58 171.05 171.05
Large Firms 174.01 174.01 174.83
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